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CURRENT COMMENT 
FULL-LINE FORCING OF LESS THAN REQUIREMENTS BY 
THREAT OF REFUSAL TO DEAL-A PER SE VIOLATION? 
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER* 
Veering from its prior course, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit has, in Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co.,! further distended the al­
ready bloated class of pel' se violations of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff 
in the case was the lessee of a filling station carrying petroleum products 
on a lease and sales agreement with Sinclair. After a continuous twelve­
year arrangement, the defendant oil company refused to renew the lease 
because, the trial judge found, "of the decline in gasoline gallonage [at the 
station] and because plaintiff was not handling enough Goodyear TBA 
[tire, battery, and accessory] products."2 The parties conferred, plaintiff 
placed an order for over $1,000 worth of TBA, and a new lease was signed. 
During the next eight years, plaintiff bought some TBA from the defendant 
(who sold Goodyear products under a commission agreement with that com­
pany) but continued to buy more than ten times as much from Firestone 
with which it had other affiliations. At the end of the yearly lease in the 
eighth year, Sinclair refused to renew, again because of the failure to sell 
sufficient amounts of gasoline and the low volume of Goodyear TBA sales. 
Plaintiff brought a private antitrust damage suit, alleging conspiracy be­
tween Goodyear and Sinclair to monopolize the TBA trade in service sta­
tions and unreasonably to restrain trade. 
The district court3 found that the commission agreement between 
Sinclair and Goodyear was not, on its face, violative of the antitrust laws 
and that plaintiff had failed to prove that it had been illegally applied. 
''\lhiIe finding a "not insubstantial amount of commerce" affected by the 
sales of TBA in the area, it found a legitimate business motivation in Sin­
clair's sales of Goodyear TBA (a desire to have a high quality line available 
at service stations bearing its name) and concluded that, absent a condition 
or agreement tying the sale of gasoline to the purchase of TBA, such 
motivation was sufficient to excuse the cancellation. Following a substan­
tial line of cases, it concluded that a mere refusal to deal was not tanta­
mount to an agreement regardless of the seller's motives. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding a violation of the first section 
of the Sherman Act. It held that when plaintiff, in an effort to regain his 
• Assistant Professor of law, Syracuse University College of Law, Syracuse 10, New York. 
1. TRADE REG. REI'. (1960 Trade Cas.) 1169771 (4th Cir. July 11, 1960). 
2. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 171 F. Supp. 37, 43 (D. Md. 1959 ). 
3. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 171 F. Supp. 37 (D. Md. 1959 ). 
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lease, agreed to buy TBA in the interim between the two leases an illegal 
tying contract was fonned. The court was not troubled by the lack of an 
express agreement, inferring an agreement from the course of dealing. 
Coupling this agreement with Sinclair's substantial sales of petroleum 
products and the not insubstantial quantity of TBA sold in the relevant 
market, it concluded that a per se violation of the Shennan Act had been 
proven, thus making the evidence of legitimate business motivation irrele­
vant. Nor was it significant that the quantity of the tied product was less 
than the purchaser's requirements, i.e. that, at best, the agreement was one 
to buy some TBA from the petroleum company. The case was remanded 
to the district court solely for the purpose of ascertaining damages. 
THE AGREEMENT AND REFUSAL To DEAL 
A startling aspect of the case is that the opinion was written by Chief 
Judge Sobeloff who one year before wrote the opinion in McElhenney Co. 
v. Western Auto Supply CO.,4 and that the opinion in the principal case 
cites the McElhenney case as precedent. McElhenney was an auto supply 
store, associated with the Western Auto chain, holding a dealership con­
tract which authorized it to use the Western Auto name. The contract, 
aside from stipulating a required purchase as an opening stock, did not ob­
ligate plaintiff to purchase future requirements from defendant or to re­
frain from the purchase of competitors' goods. It did, however, contain a 
provision allowing either party to cancel the contract on thirty days written 
notice. Plaintiff alleged that, from 1950 until the defendant cancelled its 
contract in 1956, defendant's representatives attempted to coerce it into 
taking all its requirements of a line of goods on threat of cancellation of the 
contract; that, in fact, as a result, it had purchased some supplies it other­
wise would not have purchased, and that, nonetheless, since it refused to 
deal exclusively in ·Western Auto distributed television sets, its contract was 
cancelled. The district court granted a motion to dismiss the complaint on 
the ground that it failed to state a claim.1i On appeal, the Court of Ap­
peals for the Fourth Circuit, per Chief Judge Sobeloff, afed. The gist of 
the opinion was that the complaint had failed because it alleged merely a 
unilateral refusal to deal, and that while an illegal contract could be im­
plied from a course of dealing, the facts alleged were insufficient for that 
purpose.6 
The distinction between the two cases, according to the court, is that, 
as a condition to reinstatement of his lease, Osborn agreed to purchase 
over $1,000 worth of TBA while McElhenney did not have any pre-con­
tract conferences. It was not the eventual cancellation in Osborn, appar-
4. 269 F.2d 332 (4th Gir. 1959 )· 
5. McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 167 F. Supp. 949 (W.n.s.c. 1958 ). 
6. Since the complaint is not reproduced in the opinion, the assumption is made 
that the facts discussed in the opinion were, in fact, properly pleaded. Nothing in the 
opinion suggests otherwise. 
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ently, tlIat constituted a violation, despite tlIe fact tlIat tlIe tlIeory of tlIe 
complaint turned on tlIat cancellation.7 
Viewed in tlIis light, it is difficult indeed to distinguish McElhenney 
from Osborn. The plaintiff, in the former case, alleged that there was a 
contract which was subject to cancellation by either party on short notices 
and that it was able to keep the defendant from cancelling for six. years 
only by acceding to its purchase demands, consequently buying a line of 
products. It seems a most untenable distinction that Sinclair cancelled 
and tlIen renewed on getting an order while Western Auto merely threat­
ened to cancel to get its order. If successful pressure to buy supplies is tanta­
mount to an illegal agreement when coupled with a threat to terminate or 
not to renew (the two are indistinguishable) a business relationship, such 
agreement existed in both cases. 
Nonetheless, Osborn may have reached the appropriate result consid­
ering only this aspect of the case. A dealer, acting unilateraIIy,9 has a right 
to refuse to deal with a potential customer for any reason and without re­
gard for the legality or illegality of his objective10 unless the refusal 
amounts to monopolization.ll In the past, courts have deduced from this 
basic rule tlIe corollary that such a dealer is immunized from private anti­
trust damages suits in his demands on customers as long as he does not bind 
them contractually to a restraint of trade.12 They have refused to find 
violations while compliance with an illegal distributive plan was obtained 
merely on threat to cut off future supplies to the offending customer. Why 
such coerced adhesion to an illegal plan should be distinguished from a 
literal "condition" or "agreement" to comply, when compliance is accom­
plished by discussion with tlIe customer, 
,
is not clear,13 especially in light 
7. "Plaintiff claims that his service station lease and dealer's sales agreement were 
cancelled by defendant (Sinclair) in furtherance of an attempt by Sinclair to monopolize 
the sale of tires, batteries, and accessories (TBA) to its service station dealers in Maryland 
and/or a combination or conspiracy between Sinclair and Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company (Goodyear) to restrain trade in those products." Osborn v. Sinclair'Refining Co., 
171 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D. Md. 1959). At page 44 of the opinion, the district judge indicates 
that the cancellation in question is the cancellation in 1956, i.e. the second cancellation. 
ld. at 44. 
8. Sixty days written notice was required. McEllienney Co. v. Western Auto Supply 
Co., 167 F. Supp. 949, 951 (W .D.S.C. 1958). 
9. Multilateral agreements to refuse to deal with an offending cnstomer are likely to 
be treated as per se violations under the doctrine of Fashion Originators' Guild of Amer­
ica, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.s. 457 (1941). 
10. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.s. 300 (1919). 
11. Individual refusals to deal have been struck down because of monopolistic intent 
in: Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.s. 143 (1951) and Eastman Kodak Co. of 
New York v. Southern Photo Materials Co.,273 U.s. 359 (1927). 
12. E.g. Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1954); Nelson Radio & 
Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952); Shotkin v. General Electric Co., 
171 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1948). See Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust 
Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847, 857-860 (1955) and cases cited. A recent contrary trend has 
been initiated: George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 
1960); A. C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.s. 
962 (1g60); Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959). 
13. The Attorney General's Committee to Study Antitrust Laws suggests that, at least 
so far as private suits based on violations of section 3 of the Clayton Act are concerned, 
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of the fact that the same type of coercion has been found illegal in actions 
brought by the government.14 It would seem that the dealer may safely an­
nounce an illegal scheme but that he may not obtain assurances of compIi­
ance15 from his customers or elicit their cooperation in making the scheme 
effective without being guilty of an illegal conspiracy to violate the anti­
trust laws. There is little reason to distinguish between actions instituted 
by the government and private actions. The anomaly created by a successful 
scheme in which customer compliance is achieved without conference must 
be ascribed to the formulation of the restraint of trade provisions in terms 
of dual action.16 
If Osborn relies on similar reasoning, the conclusion that there was an 
"agreement" seems correct, but the McElhenney result does notP It also 
follows that an agreement should be found whether a present customer 
agrees to future purchases or not. If he agrees, he is a party to an illegal 
agreement which injures him. If he refuses, assuming only that there are 
other customers who do not refuse, he is injured by the illegal agreement 
of the others since it results in the loss of his source of supply. It should not 
matter that the other customers do not discuss the exclusion of the plaintiff 
with the supplier since the effect of the discussions is to eliminate non­
complying dealers. If anything, such a customer presents a more appealing 
case than his sometime-agreeing counterpart.1S 
PARTIAL TYING AS A Per Se VIOLATION 
A more novel proposition of the court is its finding that the violative 
"agreement" was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Without considering, for the moment, the fact that Sinclair apparently 
did not attempt to have its dealers carry its line of TBA exclusively, the ap­
plication of a per se standard to this case seems questionable. True, the 
the result migl1t be explained by "the recognition that section 3 of the Clayton Act is fun­
damentally designed to protect the seller's competitors from being foreclosed from the 
market-an objective which need not comprehend safeguarding an individual buyer inci­
dentally prejudiced by a seller's refusal to deal. " Arr'y GEN. NAT'L COM1\{. ANTITRUST REP. 
136 n.28 (1955 ). The explanation regards the provisions for private suits to be of com­
pensatory design, while, in fact, the treble damage provisions seem to indicate a different 
purpose: assuring maximum enforcement. 
14. Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. FTC, 257 U.S. 441 (1922 ); United States v. Parke, Davis 
8: Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 
15. It would seem immaterial that the assurances were not contractually binding. 
United States v. Parke, Davis 8: Co., supra note 14. 
16. "Every contract, combination . . .  or conspiracy . . . •  " Sherman Antitrust Act § I, 
26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.s.C. § 1 (1958 ); " . . •  on the condition, agreement or understand­
ing • . • .  " Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914 ),15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958). 
17. The two cases may still be reconciled since, in the wake of Osborn, the Fourth Cir­
cuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an amended complaint filed by the McEI· 
henney Company. MCElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., TRADE REG. REp. (1960 
Trade Cas. ) 1]69850 (4th Cir. Nov. 2, 1960). This short per curiam opinion, however, ex­
pressly avoids the substantive issues. 
18. To favor the sometime agreeing party would seem to encourage violation of the 
law-at least sufficient violation to establish a claim-perhaps more to establish compen­
sable damage. 
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Supreme Court established a per se rule in International SaltlfJ where the 
tying product was protected by patent rights and affirmed the rule in 
Northern Pacific,20 but those cases are founded on what appears to be some­
thing more than the quantitative substantiality of the tying product. In 
Times-PicayuneP the Court in fact found insufficient market dominance 
in the control of 40% of the local newspaper circulation. In International 
Salt, the monopoly accorded by the patent supplied the needed dominance. 
Northern Pacific, however, lends more support to the conclusion in the in­
stant case, the Osborn court relying on the language in the opinion whi91 
states: tying arrangements are " ... unreasonable in and of themselves 
whenever a party has sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable 
restraint on free competition in the tied product and a 'not insubstantial' 
amount of interstate commerce is affected."22 It seems that Mr. Justice 
Harlan's dissenting opinion in Northern Pacific was correct in its prediction 
that that language would " ... leave courts and lawyers in confusion as to 
what the proper standards now are for judging tying clauses under the 
Sherman Act."23 
Arguably, something like "dominance" in the tying product is still 
the appropriate standard, though the court prefers to rename it "sufficient 
economic power." Northern Pacific can be read to hold that the district 
court properly found dominance in the uniqueness of the land holdings, 
analogizing this uniqueness to patent exclusiveness-a position urged by the 
Government. The dissent dealt with the case as though the issue were lim­
ited to the finding of "sufficient economic power" which it thought was 
synonymous with finding dominance. 
Read most broadly, Northern Pacific still retreats from a quantitative 
substantiality test. A finding of "sufficient economic power" must, at least, 
be based on some evaluation of the market position of the defendant rela­
tive to his competitors. A patent, implying the total exclusion of direct 
competition, or a unique tying product such as land may settle the issue 
sufficiently but size alone, where it does not approach dominance in the 
market, is a poor indicium of economic power. 
Osborn tried to bring himself within the doctrine of the above men-
19. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.s. 392 (1947) (holding that the leas­
ing of a patented machine on condition that the leasee purchase all supplies for the ma­
chine from the lessor a per se violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act and § 1 of the Sherman 
Act). 
20. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding it a per se viola­
tion of § 1 of the Sherman Act for the railroad to require that lessee of land along its 
right of way ship their products on Northern Pacific, unless competitive prices are lower 
or competitive service better, as a condition to granting them the lease). 
21. Times·Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.s. 594 (1953) (finding no 
violation of the Sherman Act in the reqUirement made by owner of separate evening and 
morning papers that ads placed in the morning paper be carried also in the evening edi­
tion, there being only one other paper in town which paper published only an evening 
edition). 
22. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.s. 1, 6 (1958). 
23. ld. at 19. 
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tioned cases by alleging that Sinclair was using its natural monopoly in its 
brand-named petroleum products to tie TBA. The district court found: 
"Sinclair had no ... dominant position in the petroleum field in Mary­
land or elsewhere"24 but also indicated, " ... this fact might not be im­
portant if there were clear restraints in the agreements themselves as there 
were in International Salt."25 Had the Court of Appeals rested its opinion 
on the brand-name argument, one might conclude that it was following 
International Salt. It concluded, however, that the issue was determined 
by the fact that Sinclair had "more than 10% of the gasoline sales and sta­
tions in the State of Maryland" and the fact that it was "not disputed" that 
this amounted to sufficient power in the tying product.28 It would seem, dis­
puted or not, that resting the finding of economic power on a substantial 
percentage of the market is an application of the quantitative substantiality 
test, previously limited to Clayton Act cases.21 
It may be that in citing the Standard Stations case,28 the court in Os­
born was deciding the relevant issue under the stricter test of the Clayton 
Act. If so, and if Standard Stations29 and the dictum in Times Picayune30 
are to be taken at face value, since quantitative substantiality is conceded, 
application of the per se standard might only be objectionable on the 
grounds that the court decided the case on the wrong statute. 
Nevertheless, neither the Clayton Act standard nor the looser pro­
hibition of the Sherman Act has previously been applied to a tying con­
tract where the tied product was to be purchased in amounts less than full 
requirements. The present extension seems difficult to reconcile with Fed­
eral Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining CO.31 In that Sinclair case, 
the court refused to find a violation of the Clayton Act, despite the fact 
that lessees of gasoline pumps were required to use Sinclair gas exclu­
sively; on the theory that, by acquiring pumps from others, the stations 
could deal in competitive gasoline, there, consequently, being no agreement 
24. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 171 F. Supp. 37, 46 (D. Md. 1959 ). 
25. Id. at 46 n.6. 
26. TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade Cas. ) tJ 69771, at 77035 (4th Cir. July Il, 1960). 
27. The Standard Stations case, whim authored the "quantitative substantiality " test, 
decided only the Clayton Act question, declining to consider whether "quantitative sub· 
stantiality" applied as well to Sherman Act violations. Standard Oil Co. of California v. 
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949 ). Later cases, dealing with the Sherman Act, applied a 
more rigorous standard. See discussion, supra p. 178-9 and cases cited. 
28. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, supra note 25. 
29. Ibid. (holding that sufficient control of the tying product was shown, under the 
Clayton Act standards, by showing that the seller had a substantial percentage of the rele· 
vant market without considering whether this gave him economic control of the market ). 
30. "When the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the 'tying' 
product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the 'tied' product is restrained, a tying 
arrangement violates the narrower standards expressed in § 3 of the Clayton Act because 
from either factor the requisite potential lessening of competition is inferred. And because 
for even an unlawful monopolist it is 'unreasonable per se, to foreclose competitors from 
any substantial market', a tying arrangement is banned by § 1 of the Sherman Act when· 
ever both conditions are met." Times-Picayune v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608, 60g 
(1953 )· 
31. 261 U.S. 463 (1923 ). 
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not to deal in the goods of a competitor. The court was not influenced by 
the fact that very few gasoline stations operated on a split pump basis. No 
intervening case would appear to have overturned the Sinclair holding.32 
In light of the discussion in Times Picayune33 and in consideration of the 
fact that section 3 of the Clayton Act was designed to extend the applicabil­
ity of the Sherman Act, it seems settled that, for acts governed by both 
statutes,3! the Sherman Act does not prohibit a broader range of tying con­
tracts than the Clayton Act. 
The Osborn court is saying that it is a per se violation for a seller of 
substantial economic stature to induce buyers to purchase more than one 
type of product at the same time, there being in such cases, if both products 
are offered by competitors, a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce af­
fected because what a buyer buys from one supplier, he will not buy from 
another. Since, by definition, there can be no inquiry into justification for 
such tying, the rule is harsh, indeed, harsh far beyond the discussion in 
Standard Stations which suggests that there is hardly any justification for 
tying:J� (a statement one might suppose descriptive of the seller of tied prod­
ucts which requires their exclusive use since only such seller was then under 
consideration). 
\Vhat is most troublesome about the opinion, however, is the overall 
affect. Purchase under threat of termination of dealings is tantamount to 
an agreement to buy. An agreement to buy some goods with others, assum­
ing the quantitative substantiality in the tied product and an affect on 
commerce in the tied product, is per se illegal. For some sellers this will 
present a difficult problem. 
Consider a retailer-distributor which deals in a line of products such as 
'Western Auto. It is at the mercy of the customer who wants only an item 
or two from the line, even if such partial service is highly undesirable fi­
nancially and may jeopardize the reputation of the chain. Its threat to dis-
32. But see International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), indicating that 
it was unnecessary for the court to inquire into the availability of competitive salt ma­
chines which might allow a buyer the split-pump type of flexibility. To the extent that the 
salt machine was properly patented, it must, of course, have contained unique features. 
Perhaps the uniqueness was found to be sufficient evidence of the impracticability of ef­
fective competition. Perhaps, also, despite disclaimer of such intent in Northern Pacific 
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.s. I (1958), the court was imposing a stricter standard on patent 
holders by preventing them from extending the statutory restraint of trade to tie other 
products. Of course, to the extent that manufacturers were using the salt machines, they 
were contractually bound to taking all their salt for such machines from Mortons; and see 
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, supra, which held, in part, that ineffective enforce­
ment of a contractual tying obligation was not a defense, even if it resulted in allowing a 
measure of competition in the tied product. Since, however, the offense is the agreement 
to restrain trade, such a result should not be surprising. 
33. Supra note 30. 
34. Since section 3 of the Clayton Act is limited to " . • •  goods, wares, merchandise, 
machinery, supplies, or other commodities . _ .," Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.s.C. 
§ 14 (1958), some tying cases can only be brought under the Sherman Act, e.g. Northern 
Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.s. I (1958). 
3:;. " . • •  tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond suppression of competi· 
tion • • •  ," Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.s. 293, 305 (1949). 
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continue the franchise, even though the buyer was free at all times to buy 
some competitive products, would be violative of the Sherman Act. 
Consider the normal distributor which acts as an intermediary be­
tween producers and retail outlets of, for example, food. It could, after 
this decision, be forced to supply only items selected by customers, whether 
supplying such customers was economically sound or not.S6 
Consider Sinclair. May it now attempt to sell both high test and regu­
lar gas to the same stations, or must it negotiate separately on both? What 
would happen to the former Sinclair case37 under the new standard? It 
would seem that the Supreme Court was judicious when it introduced the 
word hardly as a modifier of the proposition that tying contracts do not 
serve any legitimate purpose.3S Whether Sinclair was justified in its "tying" 
practices vis a vis Osborn7 as the district court found, is another matter. 
What is important, however, is whether companies are now foreclosed from 
multiple-product sales without consideration of their economic motivation 
under a broad rule of per se illegality. 
36. A barrier to passing on the cost is posed by section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman 
Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1959), which prohibits price differentials between 
competing customers. Cost justification is, of course, a defense to violations of Section 2(a) 
but the expense of the requisite accounting and uncertainty of the cost standard appears 
to be a substantial hurdle. 
37. FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923). 
38. Supra note 35; see also United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 
545 (E.D. Pa. 1960) for an illustration of legitimate purpose. 
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